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Abstract
This paper proposes an ex-post measure of inequality of oppor-
tunity in France and its regions by assessing the inequality between
individuals exerting the same effort. To this end, we define a fair
income that fulfils ex-post equality of opportunity requirements. Un-
fairness is measured by an unfair Gini based on the distance between
the actual income and the fair income. Our findings reveal that the
measures of ex-post inequality of opportunity largely vary across re-
gions, and that this is due to differences in reward schemes and in the
impact of the non responsibility factors of income. We find that most
regions have actual incomes closer to fair incomes than to average in-
come, excepted Ile de France where the actual income looks poorly
related to effort variables. Finally, we find that income inequality and
inequality of opportunity are positively correlated among regions.
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1 Research Question
In the literature on redistributive justice, growing attention has been paid to
the concept of equality of opportunity. This defends a responsibility-sensitive
egalitarianism. In an nutshell, individuals’ advantage is decomposed into two
kinds of determinants and these ones determine if inequality among individ-
uals’ advantages is fair or unfair. Unfair inequalities are due to factors for
which the individual is not responsible, called circumstances. As a conse-
quence we should remove these inequalities. On the contrary, the factors for
which the individual is responsible, called effort, generate fair inequalities
and this does not give room to redistribution.
The division between responsibility and non responsibility factors is far from
straightforward. Nevertheless, a consensus prevails concerning certain vari-
ables. For instance in the literature, it is often accepted that education is a
responsibility factor and father’s education a non-responsibility factor. But,
does education remain an effort variable if the father’s education has an im-
pact on the education of the offsprings? This question illustrates the difficult
task of drawing a clear cut betwwen circumstances and effort variables.
Another question concerns the measurement of inequality of opportunity.
Even though the concept of equality of opportunity is unambiguous, two
strategies of measurement have emerged. On the one hand, the ex-ante ap-
proach consists in studying the contribution of non-responsibility factors in
shaping inequalities. Effort is not a key variable in this kind of analysis be-
cause we do not need to observe it to measure inequality of opportunity. On
the other hand, the ex-post approach consists in determining if individuals
who exert the same effort actually obtain the same outcome, in other words,
if outcome is a function of effort only. These two measures are equally valid
but may lead to distinct conclusions because they measure inequality among
distinct groups. The ex-ante approach measures the inequality between indi-
viduals who share distinct circumstances and the second perspective focuses
on inequalities between individuals exerting the same effort.
These two measures of inequality of opportunity have been conducted in
many developed (Italy [7] , Belgium [14], France [20, 21], Norway [1] US [26]
among others), and developing countries (for instance in Brazil [6], Latin
America [15], India [23] , Africa [9]). In France, inequality of opportunity
has been recently studied for income and for health [21, 18, 13] with the
ex-ante approach.
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In the case of income, Lefranc et al. [21] have applied first and second stochas-
tic dominance tools to compare the income distribution conditional on the
social origin. They establish a clear hierarchy between groups of distinct
social origins, this ranking has been quite constant over time (1979-2000)
but the income distributions have become closer to each other, this indicates
the presence of inequality of opportunity but a reduction of its magnitude.
They also find that, when using the variance of incomes as an indicator of
inequality, social origin explains only 5% of the overall income inequality.
This reveals how difficult it is to explain income and this is true for most
developed countries.
Regarding health unfair inequalities, Jusot et al. [18] and Devaux et al.
[13] analyze the channels through which health inequalities are transmitted
across generations. The first study investigates by how much the correlation
between circumstance and effort impacts on the magnitude of inequality of
opportunity. They show that circumstances affect health inequalities through
their impact on effort measured by obesity, vegetable consumption, smoking
habits. Whether we should or not compensate for this indirect effect, the
results do not change in a large extent and in any case, the parental back-
ground explains the largest part of inequalities of opportunities. The second
study scrutinizes more on the mechanisms that are at the origin of inequality
of opportunity in health. They show that mother’s education has a direct
impact on offsprings’ health whereas father’s education has only an indirect
impact through the education and profession of the offsprings. In total, un-
fair health inequalities could be considerably reduced when assigning the best
circumstances to all, as the standard Gini index would decrease by 57%.
The studies on income and health cited above [21, 18, 13] correspond to the
ex-ante approach for inequality of opportunity to the extent that they study
the contribution of circumstances in shaping income and health inequalities.
Nevertheless, it could be of main interest to change the perspective such as
to include indicators of effort in order to implement an ex-post approach. To
our knowledge, this has not been studied for France. Instead this approach
has been implemented in Norway [1] where direct indicators of effort have
been used (education, profession, working hours). Several observations con-
cerning the relationship between effort and income indicate that an ex-post
approach with a direct measure of effort may be relevant for France:
First, disparities across regions of France are found to be determined more
by individuals’ characteristics [22, 11], mainly human capital, rather than
by spatial determinants such as density and potential markets. More pre-
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cisely, differences in human capital and in the sector of activity have played
a major role in explaining inequalities between individuals: Godechot [17]
found that the increasing inequalities in the last years are due to a rise in
the salary of workers working in specific sectors: entertainment and mostly
finance. Human capital and the sector are variables of effort mainly used
in the literature on equality of opportunity [1, 13, 6] and they are related
to income acquisition. An ex-post approach would thus allow to measure
directly the contribution of the effort variables to inequality of opportunity.
Secondly, when we turn to the perceptions of individuals with respect to
inequality in France [16], we observe that individuals, whatever their pro-
fessions, legitimate income inequalities when they are due to differences in
the number of working hours, the type of job, the dedication of the employ-
ees. This also gives a strong appeal to the analysis of ex-post inequality of
opportunity because this theory justifies inequalities due to effort variables
and precisely states that income inequalities are fair if income is a function
of effort only.
Finally, the European Survey on Income and Life Conditions for France pro-
vides for 2005 most variables required for such ex-post analysis, with indica-
tors of income, effort and circumstance.
In addition to develop an original ex-post analysis of inequality of opportu-
nity for France, our paper explores unfair inequalities across regions. Indeed,
French regions are old and homogeneous entities in terms of culture and econ-
omy. This influences the way that effort and circumstance affect income. In
addition, the uneven distribution of circumstances across regions (age and
father’s education for example) affects the regional labor markets and the
determination of the wage. This is also the case for effort variables such as
sectors or education.
The regional analysis provides a more precise understanding of the unfair in-
equalities in France. In a context where income inequalities has been found
to be rather low between regions, except Ile de France [11], we check whether
the same is true for unfair income inequalities. In addition, even when there
is no correlation a priori between income inequality and inequality of op-
portunity, empirical studies have shown a positive correlation between both
terms in European countries and the US [20], in Italy [7] and in India [23].
In this way, our study may give new evidence on this correlation by compar-
ing the ex-post inequality of opportunity and the income inequality across
regions.
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In terms of contribution, this paper is the first to provide an ex-post measure
of inequality of opportunity for France and its regions. Our main findings are
that inequality of opportunity is highly heterogeneous among regions in the
sense that the regions do not reward effort equally, that income inequality
and inequality of opportunity are positively correlated and that some regions
(Ile de France and Rhoˆne-Alpes in particular) have incomes nearly not cor-
related with effort variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the method-
ology for measuring ex-post inequality of opportunity. Section 3 introduces
the data, Section 4 summarizes the results and Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 Methodology
The ex-post approach checks whether effort is the only determinant of in-
come, therefore effort is the core input in this view. A first method proposed
by Roemer [28] following the ex-post approach considers that effort can be
captured indirectly through the Roemer Identification Axiom: assuming the
outcome is a monotonous increasing function of effort, once we partition
the population into types, that is to say into groups of individuals sharing
the same non-responsibility factors, the individuals who locate at the same
quantile of their income distribution per type are supposed to exert the same
effort. The fact we first partition individuals into types permits to correct
for the effect of the type on effort. This means that we measure net effort,
that is to say, effort once it is cleaned from its correlation with circumstances.
In this case, because everything that is not a circumstance is effort, this
method is often said to provide a lower bound for inequality of opportunity.
However, though difficult to delimit, effort could be partially, but directly,
captured by some responsibility factors. This restricts the power of residuals
to proxy effort. In addition, there is no guarantee that residual distributions
conditional on types are equal, and no guarantee that residuals precisely cap-
ture effort, since they also capture omitted circumstances.
For all these reasons, we propose to take into account effort variables explic-
itly, rather than implicitly through the residuals. The cut is not always clear
between circumstances and effort. Following Arneson [2], Cohen [10] and
Roemer [27, 28], our cut is strictly based on control. If the agent has, even
partially, control on the determination of the variable at some moment of his
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life, then it is a responsibility factor. The residual still inevitably includes
some unobserved effort and circumstance. Nevertheless, as shown in Section
4, the responsibility and non-responsibility factors explain about half of in-
come inequality.
We thus estimate a classical Mincerian wage (yi) equation, where the regres-
sors are split into two categories, XEi and X
C
i , where E and C stand for
effort (responsibility factors) and circumstances (non responsibility factors),
respectively:
log(yi) = β0 + β
EXEi + β
CXCi + i (1)
We do not consider residuals as part of the effort variables set1. Since
the residuals potentially include some omitted circumstances we follow the
method proposed by Bjorklund et al. [4] which consists in splitting the
residuals in a term which is standardized by standard error conditional on
circumstances, and an heteroskedastic term depending on circumstances2.
Since the dependence of the heteroskedastic term on circumstances is close
to zero, we do not include this additional term in our specification for the
rest of the paper.
As regards the potential correlation of effort and circumstance variables, it is
common to distinguish the direct effect of circumstances on the income and
the indirect effect of circumstances, exerted through the correlation with the
effort variables. We thus propose to measure ex-post inequality of opportu-
nity according to the two views, one where effort is included as such (gross
effort) and the other where effort is cleaned from its correlation with the
circumstances (net effort).
1Obviously, this residual includes effort as well as circumstance variables and it is
impossible to disentangle between both determinants. Like other papers that use earnings
equations, we include the residual into the circumstance set [1, 6]. We think this is also
more appropriate in the context of our study because we study to which extent individuals
who exert the same effort obtain the same outcome with a direct measure of effort.
2Bjorklund et al.’s decomposition is based on the following formulas:
V ar(i|XC) = σ2c
i = i − i/σc + i/σc
i = ˜
c
i + ui
ui = i/σc
log(yi) = f(X
E
i , X
C
i ) + ˜
c
i + ui
We find no significant effects in our data.
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To this end, we regress each effort variable on the set of circumstances and
the residual of each of these equations corresponds to the net effort. For
continuous variables, we proceed as follows:
XEi = bX
C
i + X˜
E
i (2)
The net effort is simply X˜Ei . For binary variables such as education or gen-
der3, the latent variables underlying the binary outcomes are unobservable.
By consequence, the residuals of the probit cannot be obtained. We thus
replace it by their best predictions, called the generalised residuals, whose
formula (see Jusot et al. [18] for details) is the following:
E(X˜E|E) = φ(bX
C)
Φ(bXC)(1− Φ(bXC)(E − Φ(bX
C)) (3)
where E(.|E) is the expectation conditional on gross effort, φ(.) and Φ(.)
are the normal density and cumulative density function of a N(0, 1) (the
residuals are assumed to be normally distributed). Therefore, we estimate
two wage equations. The first wage equation is the one given by Equation 1
and the second one replaces the gross effort by the net effort as follows:
log(yi) = β
′
0 + β
′
EX˜
E
i + β
′
CX
C
i + i (4)
Where X˜Ei is the net effort (the residual of the effort variables regressed on
circumstances).
Once we obtain the estimates, we define a situation of ex-post equality of
opportunity by following the methodology developed by Almas et al. [1].
There is ex-post equality of opportunity if the individual receives a fair in-
come, which is the income due to the sole responsibility factors (and not to
non-responsibility factors). This definition fulfils the conditions of ex-post
equality of opportunity as income is a function of effort only. So, the fair
income based on gross effort is:
log(yFi ) = f(X
E
i ) (5)
yFi = exp(β0 + βX
E
i ) (6)
We replicate all our results for net effort by replacing XE in the coming
formulas by X˜E. The individual fair income yFi is then standardized so as to
have the same average as the actual income.
yFi =
exp(β0 + βX
E
i )∑
j exp(β0 + βX
E
j )
∑
j
yj (7)
3All the categorical variables are binary in this research paper, since we transformed
the multicategorial ones into dummy variables.
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As a result, the standardized fair income (onwards it stands for the fair in-
come) depends on the non-responsibility factors of the whole population and
on the own individual’s responsibility factors. This fair income is based on
the general proportionality principle4 and proportional to the effort exerted
by the individual.
Many statistics, such as the Gini, Theil and General Entropy indexes, are
quite standard to summarize and measure inequality of opportunity. Here, we
now use a new version of the Gini Index, as generalized by Almas et al. [1] to
capture unfair income inequality. The standard Gini, based on Lorenz curves
implicitly compares actual incomes to average income. Here, the reference
income is not the average income but the fair income and this fair income is
not necessarily an equal income because differences in effort justify income
inequality. Almas et al. [1] thus propose an unfair Gini where the actual
incomes are compared to fair incomes 5. The distance between the actual
income and the fair income is a measure of unfairness in the distribution of
the individuals’ income. They formulate the unfair Gini as follows:
Gu(A) =
2
n(n− 1)µ(A)
∑
i
i(yi − yFi ) (8)
µ(A) = n−1
∑
i
yi (9)
A =
[
(y1, y
F
1 ), ..., (yn, y
F
n )
]
(10)
The unfair Gini is not derived from the standard Gini (based on actual
incomes). Indeed, incomes are sorted according to an ascending order to
compute the standard Gini. Instead, the unfair Gini orders the individuals
according to the distance between the own actual income and the own fair
income (from negative values to positive values). This gives no guarantee
that individuals are ordered identically under both statistics. As a conse-
quence, we do not obtain here a decomposition of the standard Gini between
an unfair Gini and a residual part. Instead, we have an original measure of
inequality where the reference income to asses inequality is not anymore the
mean income but the fair income.
The same methodology developed above is applied first for France, then for
each region separately. Estimates for fair income are obtained for each region
4The generalized proportionality allocation has been characterized as a compromise
solution in the first best by Bossert [5]
5The properties of the index are available in the paper by Almas et al. [1]. It is worth
noting that while the Gini index satisfies full symmetry, the unfair Gini satisfies partial
symmetry.
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separately, then compared through unfair Gini measures.
Finally, we propose an Oaxaca decomposition [24] of income across regions
in order to understand better what drives our results on the unfair Gini. To
this end, we compare the average income in one region, say region j, with
the average income in the rest of the regions, say regions −j, and explain
these differences by the contribution due to “magnitude”, “effects” and the
interaction between magnitude and effect. The decomposition is formalized
as follows:
log(yj)− log(y−j) = ∆XEβE−j + ∆XCβC−j
+∆βEXE−j + ∆β
CXC−j (11)
+∆XE∆βE + ∆XC∆βC
∆Xk = Xkj −Xk−j
∆βk = βkj − βk−j
k = E,C
With this decomposition, we can explain if differences in the mean income
are driven by differences in circumstances or effort. And for each of these
two kinds of variables, we decompose the difference between what is due to
the distribution of the variables in the region with respect to the other ones
and what is due to the impact of the variable on income. This decomposition
does not provide a decomposition of the unfair Gini. Nevertheless, it gives a
better understanding of the role of circumstances and effort in explaining dif-
ferences between regions. In this way, it provides complementary conclusions
concerning ex-post inequality of opportunity.
3 Data
The data come from the 2005 EU-SILC (European Survey on Income and
Life Conditions) data set from France. This data set has been designed at
the European level and implemented by INSEE for France. We take the year
2005 because this module contains detailed information about indicators of
effort, family background and income.
The dataset contains two parts, the first one contains information on house-
holds, the second one concerns individuals. For our purpose, we take the
module of the survey that is addressed to individuals, since inequality of op-
portunity refers to inequality between individuals and not between groups.
9
Moreover, it would be much more challenging to define the concept of effort
and circumstance for households.
Concerning the sample, we select individuals who are between 25 and 65
years-old, were wage earners, worked full-time during the 12 months in 2004
and did not change their jobs between 2004 and 2005. These restrictions are
partly imposed by the data set: questions about the sector of activity refer
to the year 2005 but incomes refer to 2004. Therefore, we select people who
did not change their profesional situation to keep the information about the
sector of activity. 6 We restrict our sample to individuals between 25 and 65
years-old to focus on individuals who are more likely to be active and we avoid
people being at the very begining and very end of their profesional career.
Finally, because the income of self-employed is not clearly identifiable, we
select wage earners only. We obtain in total 4279 observations. Details on
the variables and on the sample are provided in Tables 3 and 1.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
We split our sample into 21 regions. The actual number of regions in France is
27 but the survey does not separate Corse and Provence-Alpes-Cotes-d’Azur
(PACA) such that we have to proceed in the same way and no data is avail-
able for the 5 overseas regions.
The dependent variable is the gross labor income. We do not include capital
income in order not to mix two dimensions of equality of opportunity and
we take the gross earnings to measure by how much the labor market on
its own generates ex-post inequality of opportunity. As a consequence, our
analysis is restricted to ex-post inequality of opportunity among employed
individuals before the state operates any redistribution.
For the circumstance variables, we take father’s education, financial prob-
lems during adolescence, gender and age. Parental education is often used in
empirical analysis as a circumstance [6, 15, 20, 7]. Here, father’s education
takes 4 values according to the highest diploma obtained by the father (see
6This constraint could bias our result if job mobility is correlated with effort but the
sign of the correlation is not clear. On the one hand, individuals, the youngest in particular
often progress by changing jobs. On the other hand, those who exert less effort are more
likely to change jobs in order to benefit from unemployment benefits and are more likely to
lose their job. Therefore, to the extent that the sign of the bias is not clearly identifiable,
we maintain this choice.
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Table 1). Financial problems during adolescence is a dummy that indicates
whether or not the individual’s family faced financial difficulties when he was
between 12 and 16 years old. We include this variable in order to complement
the information on family background as we consider this may measure the
economic capital whereas father’s education indicates human capital. Gen-
der is included as a circumstance because we control for working hours. So,
even if women may tend to prefer more leisure [12] and so tend to work less
hours, because we control for this, gender should not be a determinant of
inequalities. We adopt the same view for age: we consider that two individ-
uals with the same working experience should not obtain a distinct income
whatever their age. Because we control for experience, age is included as a
circumstance variable.
Effort is defined by a set of variables: individual’s education, years of ex-
perience, sector of activity and weekly working hours (see Table 1 for com-
plementary information). Individual’s education is a categorical variable. It
takes 6 values that depend on the highest level of education attained by the
individual. This variable, although correlated with father’s education is in
general considered as an effort variable [1, 6] because the individual is at least
partly responsible for it. Moreover, we will clean for this correlation when
using the net measure of effort.
Years of experience corresponds to the years the individual spent in paid
jobs. As a result, this is an indicator of generic professional capital. The
number of years spent in the sector of activity where the individuals works
at the time is not known.
Sector of activity takes 5 values and corresponds to the sector in which the
individual works. Considering this variable as being an effort variable is
disputable: labor market restrictions may impose constraint on individual’s
choice concerning the sector of activity. But to the extent that individuals
have at least a partial control on their sector of activity, we consider this is
an effort variable.
Lastly, the weekly working hours correspond to the hours per week an in-
dividual worked in his job. In the survey, the individuals are not asked to
declare the official weekly working hours but the number of effective working
hours they usually spend working in a week. This variable should be an
indicator of dedication at work. But in this way, we do not account for the
fact that working hours, and specially part-time jobs can be imposed.
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More descriptive statistics concerning the frequencies of the variable per re-
gion for categorical variables, the mean and variance for continuous variables
are reported in Tables 3 and 2. In a nutshell, all the variables cited above
have been commonly used in the literature on equality of opportunity. Al-
mas et al. [1] as well Bourguignon et al. [6] for instance also use indicators
of working hours, level of education, gender and sector of activity (public
vs private). For France, mainly Lefranc et al. [19, 20, 21] have worked on
inequality of opportunity from the ex-ante perspective using stochastic dom-
inance tools. Therefore they use only one circumstance, the occupation of
the father. Also, because they adopt a long term perspective, they use the
Household Budget Survey that is available from the seventies whereas the
EU-SILC has been launched since 2004. This is a reason why our data are
not directly comparable. The advantage of the EU-SILC survey is the fact
that many indicators of effort are available and this is not the case for the
Household Budget Survey. Moreover, Lefranc et al. have focused on the
gross and disposable income, by including labour and asset income, and we
focus on the gross labour income only.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
4 Results
4.1 Preliminary results
4.1.1 An overview of wage determinants in France
Since effort variables are partially determined by circumstances, we first es-
timate net effort (effort cleaned from its correlation with circumstances) for
France from Equations 2 and 3. Results are reported in Table 47. Though
not central to our research question, some results are noteworthy. Father’s
education has a significant impact on offspring’s education when the offspring
has achieved at least upper secondary school. In this case, more educated
fathers grow more educated children. Also, education depends on financial
problems: if the family faced financial problems during the adolescence, it
increases the probability of having a low level of education. Instead, hav-
ing financial problems during adolescence has a positive effect on experience.
An explanation is that the years of experience is negatively correlated with
7The regression estimated to purge the effort variables from their correlation with
circumstances is made on a national, instead of regional, basis due to data limitations.
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education, since individuals stop studying and enter the labour market. Con-
cerning working hours, it depends significatively on father’s education and
on gender. As expected, men tend to work more hours than women do and
more educated people tend to work more.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
We can then estimate the wage equation by using successively the gross and
net version of effort, Equations 1 and 4 respectively. As reported in Table
5, the results vary whether we consider the gross or net effort. As expected,
the significance and the magnitude of the parameters of circumstance and
effort respectively increase and decrease when effort is estimated in its net
version. We find that the explanatory variables explain around 41% of income
inequality. And if we decompose the R squared, we obtain that 32% of income
inequality is explained by the effort variables and 9% by circumstances. Our
indicators of effort provide a good explanation of income inequality. Also,
almost all the coefficients are significant and of expected sign. Only the fact
of having accomplished primary school or not having any diploma does not
make any difference and financial problem becomes significant only when
using the net measure of effort. When turning to the rest of the variables,
we observe that father’s education and age have a positive impact on income
as well as being a man and working in a sector that is not agriculture. Also
education is highly significant and has a increasing impact on income as the
level of education increases. Experience does not present non linearity but
still has a positive impact on earnings as well as the number of working hours.
This national regression is consistent with classical results in the literature
and confirms the hypothesis of the presence of inequality of opportunity in
France. At a national level, inequality of opportunity is mainly due to the
impact of gender and father’s education and, to a lower extent, to age and
financial problems.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
4.1.2 Regional analysis
Our point to compare regions is related to the possible heterogeneity char-
acterizing the French regions. A first result is that regional dummies added
to the wage Equation 1 are strongly significant. Moreover,we also find that
these regional differences are not due to different sectoral profiles of the re-
gions because interaction terms relating sectors and regions do not remove
the significance of regional specific dummies8. This confirms a first intuition
8Results are not reported but available upon request.
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according to which there is heterogeneity in income inequality across regions
in France.
We thus estimate the wage Equation 1 for each region in its net and gross
versions of effort. Results are reported in Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE
Regarding the circumstances, we find that they affect income inequality dif-
ferently across regions. Firstly, the variables “age”, “gender” and “having a
father who went to the university” are circumstances that remain in (almost)
all cases significant and that affect positively the earnings. However, the size
of the impact is now very different from one region to another. Indeed, when
taking into account only the significant coefficients, the coefficient “gender”
varies between 0.094 for Lorraine and 0.285 for Auvergne. The effect of gen-
der in Auvergne is three times as large as in Lorraine, once all the other
sources of income inequality are controlled for. The Figure 1 shows the vari-
ation in the coefficients across regions. The same difference is observed for
the effect of father’s education. By comparing only significant coefficients,
the effect of having a father who went to the university with respect to a fa-
ther with no diploma is the smallest in PACA-Corse with a coefficient equal
to 0.366 and the effect is the largest for Limousin with a coefficient equal
to 0.832. The Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 order the region in increasing order of
income level (the first table contains the “poorest” regions), and the smallest
and largest effects have been found for the half poorest regions, therefore we
cannot conclude that income level might explain the variation in the impact
of unfair sources of inequalities. Finally, financial problem has a very small
impact on earnings, even in Ile de France, which implies that the explanation
cannot be related to the sample size. As a conclusion for circumstances, the
transmission of advantages seem to be better captured by the human capital
rather than the economic capital of the family.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Looking at the effect of effort variables, we first observe that regions do not
reward equally effort. Working in a sector or another does not appear to
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have a significant impact on earnings9. Indeed for half of the regions, not
even one coefficient is significantly different from zero. On the contrary,
the other effort variables are often significant, especially “working hours”,
“experience” and “education” (precisely the dummy that indicates that the
individual achieved at least upper secondary education). This shows how
much our indicators of effort are relevant, given the smaller sample size in
the regional analysis, for explaining income inequality. In addition, we also
obtain a great variation in the reward schemes across regions. The Figure
1 displays the effect of education and working hours on the earnings. The
impact of having lower tertiary education varies between 0.073 in Nord-Pas-
de-Calais and 0.314 in Limousin. The same large difference is observed for
“working hours” whose impact goes from 0.07 in Nord-Pas-de-Calais to 0.036
in Champagne-Ardenne.
As a conclusion for these first results, we obtain that circumstances have in
France a direct and also an indirect effect on effort. Even though the sources
of unfair inequalities are in general the same across regions, the size of the
impact of each source is very distinct from one region to the other. This
would justify a regional approach for the design of redistribution policies. In
order to analyse to which extent regions differ in terms of ex post inequality
of opportunity, we turn to the comparison of the unfair Gini.
4.2 Standard Gini versus unfair Gini
By using the fair income Equation 7 and computing the unfair Gini formula
presented in Equation 9, following Almas et al. [1] methodology, we find
that in most cases the unfair Gini is smaller than the standard Gini (see
Table 10 and Figure 2). It decreases for example at the national level from
0.27 to 0.22. This means that the distribution of actual income is closer to
the distribution of fair income rather than to the egalitarian distribution.
As second result, we note that the gross and net versions of the unfair Gini
measures, respectively 0.23 and 0.22 at the national level, are quite close,
compared to the standard Gini, 0.27. It indicates that the indirect effect
is relatively small with respect to the direct effect of circumstances or, in
other words, even tough the circumstances affect the effort variables, the
contribution of this correlation to the inequality of opportunity is rather
limited.
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE
9Changing the sector of reference does not change the empirical results.
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In addition, when we focus on the analysis per region, we note that the Un-
fair Gini (in its gross and net versions of effort) is lower than the Standard
Gini for 19 of the 21 regions. The actual distribution of income is there-
fore less egalitarian than fair at the regional level as well. It even decreases
below 0.1 in 7 regions (Centre, Bourgogne, Lorraine, Franche-Comte´, Pays
de la Loire, Bretagne and Auvergne). According to the theory of equality
of opportunity, unfair inequalities are so small in such regions that (nearly)
no redistribution is required. Notwithstanding, the heterogeneity remains
quite substantial across regions. In many regions, the unfair Gini remains
relatively high around 0.2 (Alsace, Haute/Basse-Normandie, Midi-Pyre´ne´es,
Languedoc-Roussillon).
Quite interestingly, the Unfair Gini remains respectively as high and higher
than the standard Gini in Rhoˆne-Alpes and Ile de France. It means that the
income distribution is closer in these regions to the equal distribution than
to the fair income distribution. The relationship between effort and income
thus appears to be quite weak. Such results are quite unexpected. First,
their respective sample sizes are the largest of our dataset, so that measure-
ment uncertainty should not be the core worry. Second, these regions both
have a major city (Paris and Lyon) where education (an effort variable) was
expected to play a central role. According to the theory of equality of oppor-
tunity, more redistribution should occur in these two regions than elsewhere
in France. These specificities of Ile de France and Rhoˆne-Alpes will be fur-
ther explored and discussed in next Section where we decompose the wage
differences across regions into magnitude and effect (coefficient) factors for
both circumstance and effort variables.
We finally consider the relationship between income inequality and inequal-
ity of opportunity. There are three remarkable changes in terms of rankings:
Auvergne and Bourgogne that display high level of income inequality perform
much better in terms of equality of opportunity. On the contrary, Alsace,
which has a quite low level of income inequality, displays high level of in-
equality of opportunity. For the other regions, the two first maps of France
illustrated in Figure 2 illustrate a strong correlation between income inequal-
ity and inequality of opportunity. To explore further our case, we also show
in Figure 2 the rankings of regions in terms of gross labour income: the cor-
relation between income level and inequality of opportunity appears to be
much weaker among the French regions.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
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4.3 Decomposing income inequalities across regions
We finally provide an Oaxaca decomposition (Equation 11) to explain and
explore whether differences in the regional mean income are driven by differ-
ences in circumstances or effort and for each of these variables what is due
to differences in their magnitude (∆X iβi−j where i = E,C) and what is due
to differences in their effect (∆βiX i−j). The results are reported in Table 11
for the net version of effort.
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE
Contrary to the approach of the precedent sections, the Oaxaca Decompo-
sition has an interregional approach, and is silent about intra-regional un-
fairness. This decomposition shows that effort variables can contribute to
differences in regional wage equations by two channels: magnitude and ef-
fect. It first appears from Table 11 that the variability of magnitude channel
is larger than the coefficient channel, reflecting that effort variables (working
hours, education, sector, experience) differ from one region to the other and
that their respective contribution to the income are highly heterogeneous.
This result tends to confirm previous results reported in the penultimate
paragraph of Subsection 4.1.
We also note that the magnitude channel affects quite negatively Franche-
Comte´, Basse-Normandie, Picardie among others, which reflect the relatively
lower magnitude of the sectors and education effort variables for these re-
gions (see Table 3), and that the effect channel affects quite negatively Bour-
gogne, Franche-comte´ and PACA-Corse, which reflects different effort reward
schemes.
As noted in Section 4.2, Ile de France and Rhoˆne-Alpes differ from other
regions in terms of fairness, with an unfair Gini larger than, or close to, the
standard Gini, which indicates that effort and income are weakly related.
This result relied on intra-regional measures. The Oaxaca decomposition
indirectly confirms for Ile de France the weak role of effort (less than 20%
of contribution) in explaining the inter-regional differences of income. The
circumstance coefficient factor is the main contributor to explain the large
inter-regional income differences for Ile de France, meaning that father’s ed-
ucation or age for example have a larger impact on income than in other
regions.
The Oaxaca decomposition presented in this Subsection confirms, with its
ex-ante flavour, that effort is not the sole contributor to the income distri-
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bution, and that a redistribution policy could also occur on an inter-regional
basis (national policy), and not only intra-regional basis (regional policy) as
discussed in the precedent sections.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we aim to analyze inequality of opportunity by following an
ex-post approach designed to consider more directly the effort and to pro-
vide an interregional comparison of inequality of opportunity. To this end,
we use a French data set that includes several indicators of effort and explain
income inequalities by differences in responsibility and non-responsibility fac-
tors. We define the fair income by using Almas et al. methodology [1] and
measure the magnitude of ex post inequality of opportunity in each region
by the distance between the actual income and the fair income. Finally, we
use Oaxaca decomposition to further explore the sources of regional wage
differences and the heterogeneity in unfair inequalities across regions.
We first find that the national unfair Gini is lower than standard Gini, which
indicates that the actual income distribution is closer to the fair income dis-
tribution than to the average income. We find that this result also holds
for most regions. The actual income are so close to fair income in some re-
gions (unfair Gini lower than 0.1) that nearly no redistribution is required
according to the theory of equality of opportunity. We also note that the
unfair Gini is larger than the standard Gini in Ile de France, which quite
surprisingly indicates that the actual incomes are more egalitarian than fair,
or in other words that effort variables are poorly related to the actual income
distribution. This result is somehow corroborated by the Oaxaca decomposi-
tion which emphasizes the small contribution of effort variables in explaining
the wage difference with other French regions. Our regional approach allows
different reward schemes of effort across regions. The empirical estimates
indeed confirm a large heterogeneity for the effects of education and even
working hours.
We then find that the ranking of regions in terms of ex-post inequality of op-
portunity is quite similar to the ranking in terms of income inequality (which
confirms previous results in the literature), but that no similar correlation
arises between inequality of opportunity and income level.
The large heterogeneity found in the effort contribution to the wage equation
reveals important differences in intra-regional unfairness, justifies a regional
18
approach and indicates that policies aiming to reduce inequality of opportu-
nity should be optimally designed at a decentralized level.
Finally, the regional approach raises a new question related to the choice of
the region. The choice of the region is certainly at the crossroad of circum-
stance and effort definition. As developed in Baccaini [3], the inter-regional
mobility rates increase over time. An extension of this analysis would be to
explicitly consider migration as an effort variable, controlling for its endo-
geneity and assessing to which extent it contributes in reducing interregional
unfairness differences.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Description of the variables
Name Format Values Category
Gross labour income Numerical [3,055;271,962] Dep. variable
Age Numerical [25;65] Circumstance
Gender Dummy 0: Woman Circumstance
1: Man
Father’s education Categorical 1: lower than 1ary education Circumstance
2: 1ary education
3: 2ary education
4: 3ary education
Financial problems Categorical 0: Never or few Circumstance
during adolescence 1: More than few
Weekly working hours Numerical [11,97] Effort
Years of experience Numerical [0,49] Effort
Individual’s education Categorical 1: Uncomplete 1ary Effort
2: Complete 1ary
3: Complete lower 2ary
4: Complete upper 2ary
5: Complete lower 3ary
6: Ms.C, Ph.D.
Sector of activity Categorical 1: Agriculture Effort
2: Energy and Industry
3: Construction
4: Services
5: Public sector
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Gross labour income 29,852 18,357
Worked hours 39.7 8.1
Age 42.6 9.3
Years of experience 21.5 10.5
Years of experience squared 573.7 470.5
Observations 4279
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Table 5: Wage Equation - National level
Variables Gross effort Net effort
Father’s education: 1ary 0.083*** [3.187] 0.132*** [5.066]
Father’s education: 2ary 0.131*** [4.796] 0.242*** [8.646]
Father’s education: 3ary 0.198*** [6.226] 0.464*** [14.569]
Financial problems during adolescence 0.001 [0.109] -0.034*** [2.982]
Gender 0.165*** [13.747] 0.195*** [17.525]
Age 0.008*** [5.294] 0.006*** [4.224]
Industry 0.258*** [5.150] 0.126*** [4.580]
Construction 0.158*** [3.000] 0.059** [2.359]
Services 0.233*** [4.680] 0.114*** [4.017]
Public sector 0.124** [2.481] 0.049* [1.704]
Education: 1ary 0.003 [0.092] 0.006 [0.399]
Education: low 2ary 0.169*** [6.019] 0.088*** [6.442]
Education: up 2ary 0.197*** [9.491] 0.128*** [10.145]
Education: low 3ary 0.566*** [25.141] 0.339*** [25.594]
Education: Ph.D 0.867*** [23.622] 0.394*** [23.628]
Experience 0.028*** [11.137] 0.007*** [5.197]
Experience squared -0.000*** [9.709] -0.000*** [6.169]
Weekly working hours 0.011*** [16.140] 0.011*** [15.854]
Constant 8.381*** [110.046] 9.665*** [136.676]
Observations 4279 4279
R-squared 0.415 0.408
Notes. Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%
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Table 10: Inequality of Opportunity in the Regions - Gini measures
Region Gini Unfair Gini (gross) Unfair Gini (net) Annual Earnings
Ile de France 0.299 0.399 0.377 36,558
Champagne-Ardenne 0.271 0.157 0.147 28,779
Picardie 0.238 0.141 0.160 25,705
Haute-Normandie 0.294 0.227 0.253 30,773
Centre 0.212 0.066 0.097 26,360
Basse-Normandie 0.280 0.211 0.236 26,724
Bourgogne 0.222 0.046 0.053 26,824
Nord-Pas-de-Calais 0.248 0.153 0.158 28,352
Lorraine 0.190 0.100 0.086 26,215
Alsace 0.215 0.191 0.158 29,199
Franche-Comte´ 0.200 0.050 0.035 25,483
Pays de la Loire 0.236 0.082 0.099 26,233
Bretagne 0.218 0.064 0.069 26,856
Poitou-Charentes 0.236 0.130 0.114 25,940
Aquitaine 0.248 0.149 0.138 27,308
Midi-Pyre´ne´es 0.277 0.186 0.173 29,750
Limousin 0.241 0.096 0.147 25,433
Rhoˆne-Alpes 0.288 0.288 0.282 31,942
Auvergne 0.266 0.043 0.083 27,369
Languedoc-Roussillon 0.288 0.192 0.197 27,365
PACA and Corse 0.250 0.180 0.174 28,714
France 0.269 0.228 0.219 29,852
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Figure 1: Impact of gender, father’s education, education and working hours
on (log) earnings across regions
33
Figure 2: Standard Gini (upper left), unfair (net) Gini (upper right) and
GDP (down) - the darker the filling, the larger the Gini or GDP
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